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THE ROLE OF MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES IN MERGER
AGREEMENTS

When entering into a contract of any kind, parties
strategically structure their negotiations to maximize potential gains
and minimize potential losses. In discerning the probability of the
potential upside or downside of a transaction, parties to large
commercial transactions typically focus on the magnitude of risk that
a deal requires them to take.1 Consequentially, modern contract
provisions have evolved to enable parties to allocate the various
types of risk associated with a given transaction, with the ultimate
goal of producing a contract amenable to the needs and concerns of
both parties. In the context of modern merger and acquisition
agreements, an array of risk-allocating provisions have become
common-place, drafted with the goal of providing parties with a
The author would like to thank Professor Kenneth Kettering and the University of
Miami International and Comparative Law Review for their assistance in reviewing
and editing this article.
1 STANLEY FOSTER REED, ALEXANDRA REED LAJOUX & H. PETER NESVOLD, THE
ART OF M&A: A MERGER/ACQUISITION/BUYouT GUIDE 465 (4th ed. 2007)

(explaining that negotiations of merger agreements is "in large part, an effort by the
parties to allocate the risk .... ).
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certain degree of flexibility between the time that a definitive merger
agreement is executed and the closing of the transaction.
While contracts to acquire any sort of asset typically
incorporate a negotiated "due diligence period" between the date on
which the parties enter into the contract (the execution date) and the
date on which the purchase price is paid and title to the asset is
transferred to the purchaser (the closing date), merger agreements in
the U.S. are unique as certain corporate and regulatory requirements
necessitate such a gap in time to remain in compliance with applicable
law. 2 Thus, many of the risk-shifting devices in merger agreements
relate to the potential that the asset being acquired (the target
company) might deteriorate during that gap period.3
For example, representations and warranties regarding
specific legal and/or financial conditions or events -such as the risks
associated with third-party litigation being brought against the
target-shift the risk associated with any number of factors to the
appropriate party, potentially allowing a party to walk away from a
deal should a certain risk be realized. Similarly, termination fees
insure potential acquirors against the risk that the target will pull out
of a merger (which is likely to occur upon receipt of a superior bid)
by compensating them for the expense of their negotiation efforts
should a deal fall apart. Conversely, earn-out provisions provide a
mechanism to affect pre-negotiated purchase price adjustments, thus
reducing the target's risk that it might miss out on an unanticipated
windfall resulting from the synergies generated by the merger's
consummation. Today, such provisions are standard fare in merger
agreements, 4 and so-called "hell or high water deals"-which
provide no walk-away rights to the parties under any circumstances -are a rarity.5

Robert Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through AAC Clauses
in Business CombinationAgreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2007, 2012 (2009).
2

3,

4

ld.

See generally Theodore N. Mirvis, Takeover Law and Practice 2010, 1808

PRACTISING LAW. INST./CORP. 529, 601 (2010) (discussing the Delaware Supreme

Court's acquiescence to "deal protection" devices).
Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and ContractualConditions, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 755, 758 (2009).
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Another class of contract provision is known as a "material
adverse change" ("MAC") or "material adverse effect" ("MAE")
clause; both of these are generally referred to as a MAC clause. These
clauses are intended to trigger a party's right to walk away from a
transaction when an adverse change not otherwise specifically
accounted for in the contract occurs, subsequent to the execution date
but prior to closing, that has a significant negative impact on either
party to the transaction or on the potential success of the merger
itself.6 MAC clauses appear in some form in virtually all publiccompany merger agreements.7 Unlike with other risk-shifting devices
(such as terminations fees), which typically call for liquidated
damages, when one party suffers a MAC, as defined in the contract,
the other party has the right to walk-away from that transaction
without incurring any associated cost.8
As discussed further in Part I, MAC clauses are thought to
serve as a backstop to the contract's risk-allocation devices, guarding
against the risks associated with unforeseen or unforeseeable events
that cannot practicably be drafted into a contract with specificity.
However, the lack of clarity provided by the Delaware Court of
Chancery as to what sort of unforeseen or unforeseeable events rise
to the level of "materiality" has led to a market in which MAC
clauses now give "rise to more disputes and more litigation than any
other provision of business combination agreements." 9
Part II will explore positive and negative consequences of
vague contract language, and why parties appear to insist on vague
MAC clauses in merger agreements. Part III will provide an overview
of United States case law concerning MAC clauses. Part IV will
discuss the resulting Delaware case law, which has significantly
called into question the practical utility of MAC clauses as a
mechanism for allowing an acquiror to terminate a merger
transaction, and created a great deal of uncertainty in the market for
6

Mirvis, supra note 4, at 611.

7 Id.

Miller, supra note 2, at 2012.
9 Robert Miller, Canceling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 99, 105 (2009)
(discussing the failure of MAC clauses that inadequately define a materiality
standard).
8
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mergers and acquisitions. Part V will analyze the current (and
arguably negative) practical consequences of that case law, looking at
the impact that a MAC has on targets, as well as the leverage the
clauses can provide to acquirors.
Against this backdrop, this Article will argue that the existing
approach to drafting MAC clauses has proven unworkable in
practice, and thus, that a fundamental reevaluation of how MAC
clauses are drafted in merger agreements is warranted. In evaluating
what considerations should be taken into account in devising such a
reevaluation of the domestic approach to MAC clauses, Part VI will
look to the British approach to interpreting and drafting MAC clauses
in order to assess whether that alternative regime offers any useful
lessons for parties to U.S. merger agreements. Finally, Part VII will
evaluate potential solutions to mitigating the uncertainty associated
with MAC clauses.
II. INTRODUCTION TO MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES

A. Evolution of the Modern MAC Clause
It is only in recent history that MAC clauses have become a
focal point of negotiation, litigation and legal discourse.10 Until
recently, MAC clauses had been considered mere "boilerplate"
provisions," which were typically drafted broadly and demanded
little attention from drafting attorneys.12 As traditionally drafted, a
MAC clause would typically provide that "any change, occurrence or
state of facts that is materially adverse to the business, financial
condition or results of operations" of the target after execution of the
contract would permit the buyer to terminate the transaction. 13
MAC clauses first began to garner attention following the
economic volatility of the later 1980s, and more so in the 1990s amidst
10Molly Brooks, The "Seller-friendly" Approach to MAC Clause Analysis Should
Be Replaced by a "Reality-friendly" Approach, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 83, 85

(2010).
1 Andrew C. Elken, Note, Rethinking the Material Adverse Change Clause in
MergerAndAcquisition Agreements: Should The United States Consider The British
Model, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 291, 292 (2009).
12 Brooks, supra note
10, at 85.
13Id (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs:
Moral
Hazardin Acquisitions, 21 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 330, 331 (2005)).
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increased turmoil in the capital and product markets.14 While the
economic climate of the late 1980s and 1990s began to yield increased
attention to MAC clauses from attorneys, generating a more complex
structure of the provisions themselves, it was not until the turn of the
21st century that MAC clauses, and the uncertainty surrounding the
added protection that they are intended to provide, became the
controversial source of debate that they are today.15
Academics have pointed to three major developments as the
primary stimuli for the increased attention to MAC clauses at the
turn of the century. 16 First, the decline in the stock market in early
2001 led to an increase in acquirors looking for potential ways to
walk away from purchasing soured assets.1 7 Also in 2001, the
Delaware Court of Chancery released its opinion in IBP, Inc. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc. 18-a decision (more specifically explored in Part Ila) that
substantially called into question the ultimate utility of MAC clauses
in practice as a mechanism for terminating a transaction.19 Lastly, and
least surprisingly, the attacks of September 11, 2001 brought terrorism into the forefront of the public eye, giving cause for practitioners
to consider new extreme circumstances under which MAC clauses
might come into play. 20 It was following these developments that
MAC clauses began to evolve into the complex risk-allocation devices
that appear in merger agreements today, commonly carving-out
certain events deemed to be beyond the control of the target from the
definition of MAC. 21
Further attention was again drawn to MAC clauses in the
wake of the Delaware court's famous decision in Oninicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare,Inc. 22 There, the court held that targets are required to
14Brooks,
15

16
1

supra note 10, at 85.
Id. at 85-86.

Id. at 86.
Id.

IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
19 See Brooks, supra note 10, at 86.
8

20 Id.

Elken, supra note 11, at 293.
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) (requiring an
effective fiduciary out clause to protect from preclusive and coercive defensive
devices); Brian JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L.
789, 790 (2010).
21
22
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negotiate an effective "fiduciary out" into merger agreements,
allowing the target to walk away from a deal should its directors'
fiduciary duties require them to do so upon being presented with a
superior bid from another buyer. 23 The Omnicare decision and the
increased flexibility it offered to targets subsequently spawned
further attention to whether and how acquirors might be in a position
to negotiate symmetrical flexibility on their end of transactions
through MAC clauses and other deal protection devices. 24 The
heightened focus of acquirors and legal practitioners on MAC clauses
drew increased attention of legal and economic theorists struggling
to identify the scope and utility of MAC clauses in merger
agreements.25

MAC clauses once again began to dominate headlines in the
United States following the credit crisis and economic downturn
commencing in 2007 and through the height of the credit bubble in
2008, during which time several high profile acquisition transactions
collapsed, some of which resulted in controversial litigation in
Delaware courts. 26 During that period, as many as thirteen highprofile MAC disputes arose -the four largest of which ranged from
$1.5 billion to $25.3 billion. 27 Those disputes were largely responsible
for exposing to both courts and theorists the relatively new MAC
drafting practices that had by that time become standard in merger

23 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938.
24 See

Quinn, supra note 22, at 790-91.

25 Seeidat 792.
26 See

Elken, supra note 11, at 291-92.
27 Id. at 292 & n.3 ("Finish Line unsuccessfully alleged a MAC in Tennessee
Chancery Court after refusing to close a $1.5 billion acquisition of Genesco; the
private equity consortium of Bain Capital, the Carlyle Group, and Dubilier & Rice
threatened Home Depot with a MAC claim after an agreement to purchase HD
Supply for $10.325 billion, which resulted in a renegotiated agreement for nearly $2
billion less; Sallie Mae filed suit against the consortium of J.C. Flowers, JP Morgan

Chase, and Bank of America, claiming that the consortium wrongfully asserted that a
MAC occurred in refusing to close a $25.3 billion merger; KKR and GS Capital
Partners asserted a MAC claim in refusing to close an $8 billion acquisition of
Harman International." (citing Wachtell, Lipton, Rose & Katz, Recent MAE
Situations, Address at the National Economic Research Associates Symposium:
When can Buyers Walk? The Material Adverse Change Clause (Dec. 6, 2007)
(presentation on file with author))).
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agreements. 28 Today, MAC clauses are recognized as having "given
rise to more disputes and more litigation than any other provision of
business combination agreements."29
B.

Structure of Modern MAC Clauses

As noted above, the structure of modern MAC clauses in
merger agreements has evolved significantly from their origins as
simple boilerplate provisions. How and whether a MAC clause might
be invoked by either party to a merger agreement hinges primarily
on how the parties define the term "material adverse change."3 0 That
definition is then typically incorporated into merger agreements in
two ways.31 First, in its broadest application, the absence of a MAC
impacting the target's business condition commonly appears as a
stand-alone clause among the conditions precedent to closing the
transaction. 32 This application is commonly referred to as the
acquiror's "MAC out." 33 Second, the defined term, MAC, is typically
28 See

Elken, supra note 11, at 293.
Daniel Gottschalk, Comment, Weaseling Out of the Deal: Why Buyers Should Be
Able to Invoke MaterialAdverse Change Clauses in the Wake of a Credit Crunch, 47
Hous. L. REV. 1051, 1058 (2010) (quoting Miller, supra note 9, at 122).
30 Dennis J. Block, Securities Law Aspects of Mergers,
Acquisitions and Other
Corporate Transactions, in 2 UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 2010, at 355,
398 (Practising Law Inst. 2010).
" Id. at 399.
32
3 See 2010 Nixon Peabody MAC Survey: A Nixon Peabody Study of Current
Negotiation Trends of Material Adverse Change Clauses in M&A Transactions, NIXON PEABODY LLP, 1, http://nixonpeabody.com/linked media/
publications/MAC Survey 201 0.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Nixon
29

Peabody MAC Survey]. Nixon Peabody initiated this annual survey following the
dramatic stock market decline in 2000 and the events of September 11, 2001 to track
their effects on the negotiation of MAC provisions in merger and acquisition
agreements. The 2010 study examines 345 asset purchase, stock purchase, and
merger transactions with values of $100 million or greater executed between June 1,
2009, and May 31, 2010. The surveyed transactions represent a variety of important
industries and range in value from $100 million to $55.3 billion. The survey notes
that while this study is "not technically scientific and does not include private
transactions for which no agreement was made available, [they] believe the results
are statistically representative of the climate of M&A transactions during the
period." Id. It should be noted that, in some respects, this survey functions as a
marketing tool for Nixon Peabody.
3

3 Id.
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utilized as a qualifier to "bring-down" various representations and
warranties to the time of closing.34 This is done in order to ensure that
the acquiror is ultimately purchasing the same entity-both from a
legal and a financial perspective-it bargained for when it executed
the merger agreement.35
Today, the base definition of a "material adverse effect" in a
standard merger agreement might read as follows:
[Ajny change, event, or effect that, either individually
or in combination with all other changes, events, or
effects: (1) has a material adverse effect on the
business, operations, assets, liabilities (including contingent liabilities), financial condition, or results of
operations of such entity and its subsidiaries taken as
a whole, or (2) could reasonably be expected to
materially impair the ability of such entity to consummate the merger and to perform its other obligations
under the merger agreement. 36
In the wake of each of the events of the 1990s and early 2000s
discussed above, practitioners began to supplement the base
definition of MAC by including both "carve-ins" (inclusions) and
"carve-outs" (exclusions).37 In negotiating the base definition of MAC
along with the carve-ins and carve-outs that follow, targets attempt
to limit the scope of the definition of MAC in order to decrease the
potential for a court to find a change or combination of changes
sufficient to constitute a MAC under an agreement.38 Conversely,
acquirors push for as broad a definition of MAC as possible both to
increase the chances that a court will find a change or combination of
changes to constitute a MAC, as well as to increase the acquiror's
leverage over the target in the event that the acquiror desires to
terminate or renegotiate the terms of the transaction. 39 For that reason
Block, supra note 30, at 398.
REED ET AL., supra note 1, at 469.
36 Block, supra note
30, at 399.
37 Brooks, supra note
10, at 86.
38 Id at 86-87.
34

39

See id. at 87.
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(as discussed further in Part Vb), a broadly drafted MAC clause has
been said to function as a "bargaining chip" for the acquiror. 40
The prevalence of MAC inclusions and exclusions in the
public merger agreements in the U.S. has varied over the last
decade, 41 most likely in response to the historical events described
above. Between 2004 and 2007- following the events of September
11, the market crash of 2001, and the court decisions in IBP and
Oninicare- merger agreements began to exhibit MAC clauses with
less expansive inclusions and an ever-increasing list of exclusions. 42
Following the credit crunch in 2008 and 2009, a reversal of that trend
became apparent, pointing toward an increase in the bargaining
power of acquirors in a tumultuous credit market.4 3 These shifts in
the use of MAC inclusions and exclusions can also be tied to market
trends in merger agreements, which on a whole have oscillated "from
relatively buyer-friendly to seller-friendly and back to buyerfriendly", in tandem with the availability of credit to finance larger
acquisitions.44

Several carve-outs have become standard practice in drafting
MAC clauses.45 Commentators have noted that the principal purpose
of such carve-outs appears to be to remove systematic or industry
risk from the definition of MAC, as well as certain risks already
known to the parties at the time of contracting. 46 Such common
exceptions include changes or effects caused primarily by conditions:
(i) affecting the domestic or global economy as a whole; (ii) affecting
the target's industry generally, unless such conditions have a
disproportionate effect on the target as compared to the industry as a
whole; (iii) primarily caused by or related to the announcement or
pendency of the merger; (iv) stemming from shareholder class-action
litigation arising from allegations of breach of fiduciary duty related
Gottschalk, supra note 29, at 1056 (quoting Jeffrey Thomas Cicarella, Note, Wake
of Death: How the Current MAC Standard Circumvents the Purpose of the MAC
Clause, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 423, 426-27 (2007)).
41 See Nixon Peabody MAC Survey, supra note
32, at 1.
40

42

id

See id.
44 Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case
of CorporateAcquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 869 (2010).
45 Id. at 867.
43

46

id.
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to the merger; (v) resulting from actions taken at the request of one of
the parties contemplated by the merger agreement; (vi) related solely
to a decline in the target's stock price;47 (vii) resulting from changes
in laws and regulations, or in interpretation of laws by courts or
government entities;48 and (viii) resulting from terrorism, acts of war,
and changes in political conditions. 49
It remains somewhat unclear why acquirors appear to be so
willing to include some of the exceptions listed above. It can be
speculated that the decision of acquirors to include certain exceptions
may be linked to corresponding concessions by targets, such as
purchase price adjustments. Another potential explanation may be
that such exceptions are agreed to by acquirors in exchange for
targets accepting a so-called "financing-out condition," which allow
acquirors to walk away from a transaction should it be unable to
obtain adequate financing on terms agreed to by the parties to the
merger agreement. Still, such explanations seem insufficient when
contemplating why an acquiror would be willing to agree to arguably
counterintuitive exceptions, such as exceptions for changes "related
solely to a decline in the target's stock price," for example.
Carve-ins, as compared to carve-outs, remain a relative rarity
in U.S. merger agreements.50 Perhaps the most obvious explanation
for the lack of carve-ins is that, by their very nature, inclusions typically in the form of specific benchmarks -increase the risk that a
transaction will not be consummated should those benchmarks be
realized. Furthermore, it has been noted that MAC clauses are often
written ambiguously by design.51 From the target's perspective,
ambiguity in drafting MAC clauses is viewed as preferable because it
is thought to provide increased certainty that a transaction will close.
Acquirors, on the other hand, appear to prefer ambiguity in drafting
MAC clauses because they foresee being able to utilize the clause as
leverage to renegotiate a transaction upon the occurrence of an event

47

Block, supra note 30, at 400.

48

See Nixon Peabody MAC Survey, supra note 32, at 2.

49

Id. at 8.

50

Id.
Gottschalk, supra note 29, at 1053.

5
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that may or may not constitute a MAC under the terms of the
agreement.52

III. AMBIGUITY IN CONTRACTING
The failure of parties to include carve-ins delineating specific
bench-marks that constitute a MAC-especially in the wake of the
Delaware court's decision in Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v.
Huntsman Corp.53 - has left some practitioners "somewhat puzzled by
the absence of any discernable trend in this area." 54 Practitioners at
Nixon Peabody note that:
Since Hexion, we have expected the traditional MAC
out to be modified over time, either by adding more
specific elements, such as a failure to meet specific
financial milestones, decreases in sales levels beyond
a certain threshold, or customer defections and other
"quantifiable" terms that may unequivocally excuse
performance, or by incorporating these specific tests
into additional closing conditions.55
Similarly, a recent article by partners at Fried Frank in The M&A
Lawyer predicted that vague MAC conditions would begin to "give
way to greater precision and specificity[," and that parties would
begin to "attempt to quantify a MAC by specifying changes in
agreed-upon metrics[.]" 56 The failure of parties to embrace such
drafting alternatives is arguably not the best course of action for
either the parties themselves or for public policy. Indeed, the
Delaware Chancery has discussed the value of more precise
language.5 7 Furthermore, in one of the few cases where a U.S. court

52

54

Brooks, supra note 10, at 86.
Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008).

Nixon Peabody MAC Survey, supra note 32, at 4.

55Id.
56

Peter S. Golden, Arthur Fleischer Jr. & David N. Shine, Negotiated Cash

Acquisitions of Public Companies in Uncertain Times, M&A LAW., Feb. 2009, at 6.
57 See IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 65-66, 68 & n.155 (Del. Ch.
2001) (lamenting the "risk" of "uncontrollable factors" resulting from "capacious"
MAC clauses).
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actually found that a MAC had occurred, a specific dollar threshold
was included in the contract.58 Still, in practice, an overall lack of
response to Hexion from attorneys drafting MAC clauses persists. 59
A. Is Ambiguity in ContractingAlways a Bad Thing?
Given the lack of a discernable trend toward increased
specificity in MAC clauses, it should be evaluated whether ambiguity
in contracting is actually viewed negatively from the perspective of
the parties. In their article, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The
Case of CorporateAcquisitions, Albert Choi and George Triantis evaluate both the upside and downside of intentionally incorporating
ambiguity into merger agreements.60 To begin, they discuss the more
commonly understood downside of ambiguity: "[viague contract
terms invite self-interested and conflicting interpretations[,]" 61 thus
catalyzing disputes between the parties and "increas[ing] the
resources expended in litigation and the uncertainty of judicial
outcomes." 62 The resulting uncertain judicial decisions are criticized
for creating "incentives for wasteful game-playing by each party[,J"
as "[b]uyers are emboldened to threaten to walk from deals in
circumstances in which the alternative precise provision would have
foreclosed such an option." 63 Thus, vague contracts are "generally
regarded as being antithetical to efficient business descision
making." 64
However, Choi and Triantis go on to explain that vagueness
may be justified "when the expected larger litigation costs are
outweighed by saving on the front end, in lower drafting costs." 65
Furthermore, Choi and Triantis argue that uncertainty in contracting
actually "promotes deal making because each side can see what it
58

See Nip v. Checkpoint Sys. Inc., 154 S.W.3d 767, 769-70 (Tex. App. 2004)

(finding that the loss of future income and business from a major customer was at
least equal to the $50,000.00 threshold established in the contract for a MAC).
59
See Choi &Triantis, supra note 44, at 881.
60 See Choi & Triantis, supra
note 44.
61 Id. at 854.
62 Id. at 882.
64Id.
61

Id. at 854.
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wants to see in vague language[,]" thus limiting the potential that a
negotiation might break down due to a difference in opinion between
the parties. 66 The authors go on to discuss that vague language can
limit "adverse signaling"; the potential for a party proposing greater
precision in language "may send an adverse signal [to the other
party] that it believes divergence of interests and litigation to be more
likely." 67 Potential consequences of such adverse signals could be so
grave as to include an adjustment in deal price or even a complete
collapse of negotiations. 68 Finally, the authors argue that the
increased litigation resulting from vague provisions may actually
"improve contracting by operating as a screen on the seller's decision
to sue[,]" 69 and in turn, augment the bargaining power of the buyer. 70
In other words, Choi and Triantis advance the notion that the high
litigation costs created by vague language are actually a virtue, rather
than a fault,71 because such litigation costs can "work as an ex post
signaling device that promotes efficient renegotiation." 72
Despite the potential positives associated with vague contract
language, as discussed more particularly below, the practical
problems created by ambiguity in the context of MAC provisions still
appears to outweigh the potential benefits.
IV. UNITED STATES CASE LAW INTERPRETING

MAC CLAUSES

Importantly for would-be acquirors, the Delaware Court of
Chancery has given strong reason to believe that the enforceability of
MAC clauses may be extremely limited. In fact, the Court has never
once found sufficient facts to excuse a party's merger agreement
obligations under a MAC clause.73 Specifically, the cases of IBP, Inc. v.

66 Id. at

884-85.
Id. at 886.
68 See
id.
69 Id. at 854.
70 See idat 887-88 (observing that a vague MAC clause can
lead parties to settle at a
lower price).
67

71

Id. at 883.

72

Id. at 891.
See Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del.

73

Ch. 2008) (acknowledging that Delaware courts have never found a material adverse
effect in a merger agreement).
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Tyson Foods, Inc.,74 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp.,75 and Hexion
Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.,76 have significantly called
into question the ultimate effectiveness of MAC provisions. It is now
difficult to hypothesize a scenario in which Delaware courts would
actually permit an acquiror to exercise its walk-away rights under a
MAC provision. Commentators have noted that while the
interpretation of the provisions has had a significant financial effect
on the parties to such failed transactions, there has been an "even
greater ex ante impact on the contract design of future deals."77
Indeed, much of the enhanced flexibility theoretically offered by
MAC clauses-which acquirors spend so much time, money, and
effort negotiating for -may well be illusory in practice.
A. IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
In IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., a landmark decision among
those interpreting MAC clauses, the court rejected Tyson's claim that
the occurrence of a MAC excused its obligations as acquiror under a
$4.7 billion agreement78 to acquire the beef and pork distributor,
IBP. 79 The MAC clause in the merger agreement was broad and
seemingly protective of Tyson, lacking the exclusions commonly
negotiated by targets.80 The clause provided Tyson with walk-away
rights based on "any event, occurrence or development of a state of
circumstances or facts which has had or reasonably could be
expected to have a Material Adverse Effect . . . on the condition

(financial or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of
operations of [IBP] and [its] Subsidiaries taken as a whole."8 1 The
drafters, thus, shifted the risk associated with a MAC primarily to the

74
7

IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ. A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch.

Apr. 29, 2005).
76 Hexion, 965 A.2d 715.
77 See Choi &Triantis, supra note 44, at 851.
78 Brendan Murray, Tyson has a deal to acquire
IBP, THE

2001,

12:00 A.M.),

SEATTLE TIMES

(Jan. 3,

http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=

20010103&slug-biztyson3.
79
IBP, 789 A.2d at 23.
80 See id. at 66.
8' Id. at 65.
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target, which was their goal. Nonetheless, Vice Chancellor Strine,
looking to the terms of the contract as a whole, found it appropriate
to construe the MAC clause from a "seller-friendly perspective." 82
Tyson grounded its claim in part on projections (which the
court adopted in its analysis) that the target's annual earnings would
"deviate materially from the range in which [it] had performed [in
recent years]", 83 and that as a result 2001 would be IBP's worst year
since 1997.84 While Strine acknowledged that he was "confessedly
torn" on the MAC issue,85 in light of the cyclical nature of the
industry, he ultimately concluded that "[a]lthough IBP may not be
performing as well as it and Tyson had hoped" 86 in the short term,
that "IBP's earnings for the next two years would not be out of line
with its historical performance during troughs in the beef cycle."87
Strine's reasoning emphasized that a "Material Adverse Effect should
be material when viewed from the longer-term perspective of a
reasonable acquiror",88 indicating that such effects must be
"consequential to the company's earnings power over a commercially
reasonable period .
89

.

. [which should be] measured in years rather

than months."
Due to Tyson's awareness of both the cyclical nature of the
beef industry and of IBP's business specifically, the court reasoned
that the potential for IBP's short-term earnings to fall 64% behind the
comparable period in the previous year should have been somewhat
familiar to Tyson, and thus, was not the sort of change in the target's
condition that would qualify as a MAC.90 The court noted that this
sort of "hiccup" 91 in earnings could well be attributed, at least in part,
to a severe winter leading ranchers to hold back livestock. Once
winter concluded, the target could begin to perform more in line with

82

Id at 68.

8
84

Id. at 69.

Id at 69.

8' Id. at 71.
86

Id.

87 Id.

" Id at 68.
89
Id. at 67.
90 Id. at 69-71.
9 Id. at 68.
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Tyson's expectations. 92 Furthermore, the court pointed to the fact that
Tyson's own investment banker maintained that the transaction still
made "tremendous strategic sense." 93 Thus, IBP arguably counsels
parties (particularly, acquirors) negotiating merger agreements to
avoid reliance on broadly drafted MAC clauses to allocate the risk
associated with short-term changes, either in the target's earnings or
otherwise.94

B.

FrontierOil Corp. v. Holly Corp.

Although the decision in IBP was reached under New York
law, 95 it's analytical framework was adopted by the Delaware Court
of Chancery four years later in Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp. 96
Unlike in IBP, the merger agreement in Frontier Oil was modified
after its initial execution to specifically include a representation that
no actions were pending or threatened against the target or its
subsidiaries that would have a MAC-which was defined in the
agreement-on the company. 97 Shortly thereafter, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the target was named in a series of toxic tort lawsuits
that were initiated by environmental activist Erin Brockovich. 98 The
impact of that litigation on the pending merger came to a head once it
became clear that Frontier would not be able to rely on a "corporate
separateness" defense given that it had guaranteed the obligations of
its subsidiary under the lease agreement giving rise to the litigation. 99
Although the court recognized that the pending litigation
"could be catastrophic for Frontier[,J"oo it ultimately reasoned that
92 See

id. at 26.

93Id. at 50.
94 Still, the temporal distinction is not entirely clear, as the court acknowledges in a
footnote that a reported 50% decline in earnings over two consecutive quarters
would likely constitute a material adverse development. Id. at 69 & n. 156 (citing
Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., Civ. A. No. 11365, 1990 WL 193326, at *5 (Del.
Ch. 1990)).
95IBP,
789 A.2d at 52.
96 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ. A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *34
(Del. Ch. April, 29, 2005).
97

9

Id at *4-5.

'Id. at *2, *11.
99
Id at *11.
1ooId. at *36.
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"the mere existence of a lawsuit cannot be determinative[,]" but
rather, "[t]here must be some ... basis in law and in fact for the
serious adverse consequences prophesied by the party claiming the
[MAC]."101 Because Holly failed to make a sufficient showing that the

litigation was substantially likely to prevail, and because the
potential defense costs, while substantial, did not amount to a MAC
in the context of the total value of the target's business, the court held
that the acquiror failed to demonstrate that the litigation would result
in a MAC. 102 However, the court left open the possibility that in at
least some cases, "threatened litigation can be so certain, the outcome
so predictable, and the likely consequences ...

so negative, that an

observer could readily conclude that the impact that one would
reasonably expect to result from the litigation would be material and
adverse."1 03 Reading the opinion as a whole, it remains unclear
(perhaps even to the court itself) whether Frontier Oil should be read
as setting a relatively low threshold (requiring only "some basis in
law and in fact" for serious adverse consequences to arise) or a
relatively high threshold (requiring conditions "so certain . . . so

predictable ... [and] so negative) for a MAC arising from threatened
litigation.
C. Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.

Seven years after IBP, the Court of Chancery once again
reached a holding indicative of the limited utility of MAC clauses in
practice in Hexion.104 Hexion involved a merger agreement between
two large chemical companies with a purchase price of $10.6
billion,105 representing a nearly 40% premium over the target's
trading value 0 6 -an agreement the court recognized as being "more
than usually favorable" to the target.1 07 Shortly after execution of the
101
Id at *41 n.224.
102 Id. at *36-37.
03

Id. at *35.

104 Hexion

Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch.
2008) (noting that "[a] buyer faces a heavy burden when it attempts to invoke a
material adverse effect clause in order to avoid its obligation to close").
1os Id at
723.
106 Talley, supra note
5, at 756.
107 exion, 965 A.2d
at 724.
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merger agreement, Hexion's investment bankers reevaluated the
merger against the backdrop of Huntsman's poor first quarter 2008
earnings, conflated by a worldwide credit crisis. 108 Based on
evaluation, Hexion sought a declaratory judgment that that the
merger, if consummated, would produce an insolvent company, and
therefore, a material adverse change had occurred excusing its
obligations under the contract. 109
The base definition of "material adverse change" in the
Hexion contract included "any occurrence, condition, change, event or
effect that is materially adverse to the financial condition, business, or
results of operations of [Huntsman] taken as a whole."110 Unlike the
provision in IBP, the MAC provision in Hexion was qualified by
carve-outs excluding from the definition of "material adverse effect"
(1) adverse changes to general economic or financial market
conditions and (2) conditions affecting the chemical industry
generally.111 Each carve-out was then itself qualified to include in the
definition
of "material
adverse
change"
conditions
that
disproportionately affect the target as compared to the market as a
whole, or other chemical companies, respectively. 112
Hexion further plead that in any case its maximum exposure,
should it walk-away from the deal, was limited to the $325 million
cancellation fee specified in the contract. 113 The court disagreed,
finding that the new reports did not conclusively indicate that the
merger would produce an insolvent company, that no material
adverse event had occurred, and because Hexion's breach was
"knowing and intentional"-a term provided under the contractthat its exposure was not capped by the liquidated damages
provision. 114
In Hexion, Vice Chancellor Lamb's opinion both echoed and
elaborated upon much of the rationale espoused by the court in IBP.
First, the court found that because both the debt and equity of the

'os

Id at 725.
See id at 730.

109

Id at 736.
111Id.
112Id.

at 736-37.

i3id. at 746.
114

id
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target company were to be acquired in the merger, the operational
results of the business was more relevant than the capital structure of
the target.115 Thus, "[blecause EBITDA is independent of capital
structure," the court found it to be "a better measure of the
operational results of a business." 116 After concluding that EBITDA,
rather than earnings per share, constituted the appropriate
benchmark to use in examining adverse changes, the court found that
Huntsman's first-half 2008 EBITDA decrease of 19.9% from its firsthalf 2007 EBITDA was insufficient to constitute a material adverse
change. 117 In so finding, the court again stressed the lasting perspective from which MAC clauses should be construed, favoring
long-term rather than short-term evaluation.118
The court in Hexion also rejected the argument that
Huntsman's second-half 2007 EBITDA deficiency of 22% below the
projections it had originally presented to its bidders was sufficient to
trigger Hexion's walk-away rights.119 On that issue, the court pointed
to the merger agreement's explicit disclaimer of any representation or
warranty by Huntsman as to any of its projections, forecasts, or other
estimates, construing the disclaimer as a signal that the parties
"specifically allocated the risk to Hexion that Huntsman's performance would not live up to management's expectations. . . ."120
However, it is not clear whether Hexion's claim would have been
better received absent that disclaimer, as Lamb goes on to explain
that the proper benchmark for determining whether a MAE has
occurred is "to examine each year and quarter and compare it to the
prior year's equivalent period" 121 and not, as Hexion plead, to
examine whether a target has met its advertised projections. 122
Finally, the court also found that neither an increase of Huntsman's
net debt by approximately 5% or 6%, nor problems related to specific
divisions within Huntsman, rather than those relating to the

...Id. At 740.

Id.
Id.

116
117

See id.at 741.
...
119 Id. at 740.
120 Id at
741.
121 Id. at
742.
22
1 Id. at 742.
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company as a whole, were sufficient to constitute a material adverse
change. 123
There are three important lessons for acquirors stemming
from the court's reasoning in Hexion. First, the court will not construe
a MAC clause in a vacuum, outside the context of the entire
contract. 124 Rather, even standard disclaimers such as the disclaimer
in the Hexion agreement may be taken into account when assessing
what sort of events the parties intended to constitute a MAC. 125
Second, as a general matter, a target's failure to meet projections will
not be taken into account when determining whether a MAC has
occurred, unless the contract indicates otherwise. 126 As Lamb
suggests, rather than relying on a MAC provision, acquirers in
Hexion's position are better served by negotiating for an earn-out
provision, representations and warranties, or any number of
alternatives, which might provide greater specificity in order to
protect against a targets failure to meet projections. 127 Third, analysis
of MAC provisions will look to the target as a whole, and not to its
individual subsidiaries. 128 Lastly, if an acquiror is aware of factors
concerning a target's capital structure and has based its assumptions
on that knowledge, small changes to capital structure-such as a 5%
or 6% increase in net debt-are insufficient to constitute a MAC. 129
V. FLAWS IN THE DELAWARE COURT'S ANALYSIS

OF MATERIAL

ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES

A. Allocating the Burden of Proof
Strine's "seller-friendly" approach to interpreting MAC
clauses, as established in IBP, has dominated MAC jurisprudence in
the Delaware courts, 130 generating much criticism from legal theorists
arguing that the one-sided approach is likely not appropriate in every

Id. at 744.
See id at 740-41.
125Id.
123
124

126Id

at 740-41.

See id. at 741.
128 Id. at 745.
129 Id. at 744.
127
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Brooks, supra note 10, at 84.
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single case interpreting a MAC clause.131 Perhaps most-significantly,
Strine's reasoning in IBP has been extended in subsequent cases,
arguably incorrectly, for the proposition that the acquiror should
always bear the heavy burden of proving the occurrence of a MAC. 132
Commentators have pointed to a potential flaw in logic behind that
allocation of the burden of proof, arguing, among other points, that
the target presumably has greater access to the information necessary
to establish the occurrence or non-occurrence of a MAC in most, if
not all, cases.133
The allocation of the burden of proof with respect to MAC
clauses in merger agreements has also had a substantial impact on
judicial determinations of MACs in other contexts. For example, in
Capital Justice LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., where a borrower sought
declaratory judgment that a lender was obligated to fulfill its
obligations under a loan agreement upon the lender's calling of a
MAC, the court rejected Wachovia's attempt to distinguish the case
from Hexion.134 There, the district court noted that in Hexion, the
Delaware Chancery made clear that "absent clear language to the
contrary, the burden of proof with respect to material adverse effect
rests on the party seeking to excuse its performance under the
contract." 135 Thus, notwithstanding the established notion that "a
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action should always have the
burden of going forward[,]" the district court ultimately rejected
Wachovia's argument that the burden should fall on the borrower. 136
In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that the Hexion decision
"did not place the burden on the plaintiff because it was a declaratory
judgment action", but rather, "the court placed the burden on the
party asserting the existence of a MAC because MAC clauses are 'sui
generis among their contract clause brethren."' 137 Furthermore, the
3'

Id.

132 See

Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at
*34 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
133 Brooks, supra note
10, at 105.
134 Capital Justice LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 706 F. Supp.
2d 23, 28 (D.D.C.
2009).
135 Id. (citing Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.,
965 A.2d 715, 739
(Del. Ch. 2008)).
136 CapitalJustice, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (citing Hexion,
965 A.2d 715 at 739).
'n CapitalJustice, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
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court made clear that, "[blecause MAC clauses are sui generis, the
burden of proof is not determined by the form in which the MAC
clause is drafted." 38

B. Uncertainty as to the Definition of"Materiality"
Perhaps the most elusive factor in interpreting MAC clauses
is generated by the apparent reluctance of parties to merger agreements to specifically define the parameters of the word "material."
Absent such specific language defining "materiality," courts have
been loath to establish a single benchmark that would trigger a MAC,
instead favoring a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis. 139 What is clear,
however, is that the MAC threshold is a steep one. 140
In one veiled attempt to define "materiality," Paul Gadd, a
partner at Ashurst Morris Crisp, commented that "material change is
like an elephant - it is obvious when you see it."141 However, it is
rather clear that defining "materiality" is nowhere near as simple as
Gadd makes it out to be, even for experienced practitioners. To
illustrate, at the Clifford Chance law firm, a conference of bankers
was asked to vote on whether any of the following might constitute a
MAC: "a 10% drop in the EBIDTA ratio .

.

. a 25% drop in EBIDTA;

an explosion in a high profit-margin factory of a corporate [sic] which
produces a product representing 20% of turnover; and a change in
regulation which would have a significant negative financial impact
on the company." 142 While there was general agreement that it was

138

Id.

'9 See Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, AACIMAE

Provisions: Rolling Credit
Markets Render Navigating The Material Adverse Effect/Material Adverse Change
Minefield
Even
More
Challenging,
WEIL.COM,
(Nov.
2007),
http://www.weil.com/news/ pubdetail.aspx?pub=8009.
140 Id.
141Jamie Ivey, Takeover Ruling Fuels Adverse Change Debate, CORP. FIN., Nov.
2001, at 1, available at ProQuest, Doc. ID 210165676. See generally Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Ivey's characterization of materiality is reminiscent
of Justice Potter Stewart's famous explanation of how to identify "hard-core"
pornography: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced ... [b]ut I know it when I see it").
142Ivey, supra note 141.
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unlikely that the first event would constitute a MAC, the
practitioners were split evenly as to the remaining three scenarios. 143
As one commentator explains, the IBP decision can
essentially be read as creating a four-part test for establishing that a
change, event or occurrence is material under MAC clauses. 144 Under
IBP, in order for an event, occurrence, or development to constitute a

MAC:
it must (1) "substantially threaten" (2) "the overall
earnings potential" of the acquired company; (3) "in a
durationally-significant manner" (measured in years,
not months); and (4) be prove[n] to have been a
change, not an event known when the acquisition
agreement was signed.145
In practice, this test, along with the elaborations thereof set forth in
subsequent MAC cases, ultimately lacks the clarity necessary to
provide contracting parties with any sort of practical guidelines in
drafting and negotiating MAC clauses. After all, "substantial" is
nothing more than a synonym for "material," and the phrases
"overall earnings potential" and "durationally-significant" are
simply too subjective to be of any practical value in the way of
understanding the threshold for materiality.
C. Evaluating "Materiality"in Other Contexts
Although the case law that has developed for syndicated
lending is less robust than that which has developed in the context of
merger agreements, the difficulty inherent in defining "materiality"
has similarly come into play with respect to MAC clauses.146 MAC
clauses have traditionally been used in some form in loan
143

Id.

144 Gottschalk, supra note 29, at 1062.
145 Id at 1062 (citing IBP, Inc. v. Tyson

Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch.
2001) (It should be noted that "[t]he requirement of durational significance may not

apply when the buyer is a financial investor with an eye to short-term gain" (Choi &
Triantis, supra note 44, at 877))).
146 Douglas S. Buck & Erick S. Harris, CMBS Lenders Begin Invoking MAC Clauses
with Investors, REAL EST. FIN., Apr. 2008, at 13, 13-15 (April 2008).

2011

MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES

123

commitments, conditioning a lender's commitment to fund a loan on
"the absence of any material adverse change, as determined by the
lender, in the tenants, property, borrower or key principals."147 Similarly, rate lock agreements often contain MAC clauses conditioning
the agreement on "the absence of a material adverse change in the
financial, real estate, banking or capital markets, including the
mortgage-backed securities markets . . ."148
Courts evaluating MAC clauses in the context of commercial
lending have been loath to establish a standard test to determine
when a MAC has occurred.149 Furthermore, courts have been quick to
deem MAC clauses in the context of syndicated lending as being
ambiguous as drafted. 150 For example, in Capitol Justice LLC v.
Wachovia Bank, a MAC clause provided the lender with walk-away
rights upon the occurrence of a "material adverse change in the
capital, banking and financial market conditions that could impair
the sale of the loan by [the l]ender as contemplated in the term
sheet."151 There, the court found that the MAC clause-although not
atypical-was subject to multiple interpretations, reasoning that the
clause could be interpreted as defining a MAC as either a "significant
adverse change" or as "an unforeseeable adverse change."1 52
Similarly to the phenomenon discussed in Part Vb, the
volatility of the CMBS markets in late 2008 enabled lenders to begin
using vague MAC clauses as a means of backing out of, or
renegotiating, their loans to investors.153 This trend has prompted
some commentators to suggest that investors strive to limit the
application of MAC clauses by including specific financial thresholds
as well as by conditioning MAC clauses with requirements of good
faith and reasonableness.154

147Id. at

14.

148 Id.
149Id.

150See

Capitol Justice LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 706 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C.

2009).
151 Id.

152Id. at
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1
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VI. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DELAWARE CASE LAW ON UNITED
STATES MERGERS

The lack of clarity embodying the Delaware court's approach
and the fact-specific analysis of "materiality" that dominates its MAC
jurisprudence has produced significant and arguably negative
consequences in the domestic market for mergers and acquisitions.
Although the Delaware approach establishes an extremely sellerfriendly approach to interpreting MAC clauses, that approach has
also resulted in certain market conditions beneficial to buyers. While
such consequences were likely unintended by the Delaware court, in
some circumstances their market impact may nonetheless be so
severe that public policy considerations demand a fundamental
reevaluation of how MAC clauses are drafted and analyzed going
forward.

A. Negative Impact on the Target Resulting From An Acquiror
Callinga MAC
While the paradigm for interpreting MAC clauses established
by the Court of Chancery calls into question whether a Delaware
court would ever find an acquiror's claim sufficient to invoke its
rights under a MAC clause, they nonetheless have serious practical
implication from the perspective of targets. First, commentators and
courts alike have recognized that once an acquiror asserts a claim that
a MAC has occurred, regardless of ultimate judicial determination of
the merits of the claim, the effect of the claim alone nonetheless has a
substantial detrimental effect on the target. As the Delaware Court of

Chancery explained in In re Dollar Thrifty Shareholder Litigation, "[i]n
the wake of such failed deals, the formerly desired targets have often
suffered, both in terms of operating performance and market
valuation."15 5 "Simply put, when a merger between public companies
blows up because one company has declared a MAC on the other, it
is big news in the business world." 156 As one commentator notes, "it
is much worse for a party to be declared MAC'd by its counterparty
on the basis of a materializing risk than just to suffer the
materialization of that risk" because of the negative public exposure
155In

re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 616 (Del. Ch. 2010).

56 Miller, supra note

2, at 2077-78.
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of the target's business resulting from such a declaration.157 In
addition, the Delaware Court of Chancery has recognized that a
MAC clause can generate "contractual rights of inhibition" for parties
to a merger agreement, thus having the practical effect of enabling
the acquiror to "t[ie] up" the operations of the target, which is also
likely to be an industry competitor. 158
B.

Using a MAC as Leverage to Renegotiate a Transaction

Despite the overwhelmingly "seller-friendly" approach
adopted by the Delaware Chancery, the lack of clarity in the standards underlying their approach may ultimately put acquirors at an
advantage in practice. In recent years, a trend has developed
whereby an acquiror who suspects that a MAC has occurred can
leverage the threat of termination in order to renegotiate favorable
contract terms whether or not they might actually have a viable claim
under a MAC clause. 159
(i) Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, and the United States
Government
Perhaps the most high profile example of how a MAC clause
can generate significant leverage for an acquiror stems from the
recent $50 billion acquisition by Bank of America of the floundering
investment bank, Merrill Lynch160 -a deal that was recognized by
then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson as vital to "the stability of the

157 Id. at 2009 (explaining that the declaration of a MAC can result in "a public
dispute about whether the company has been MAC'd ... imperils its relations with
employees, customers, creditors, and others with whom it does business; publicly
releases negative information about the company that otherwise would have
remained confidential; exposes the company to disparagement by the counterparty;
and, if the dispute is litigated, can even lead to a public certification by a court that
that the company is, in effect, damaged goods").
158 Transcript of Scheduling Conference at 29, SLM Corp. v. J.C. Flowers II L.P.,
C.A. No. 3279-VCS (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2007), dismissed, Jan. 28, 2008.
159See Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP,
supra note 139.

160See Bank ofAmerica to Purchase Merrill Lynch: Deal Worth $50 Billion
Creates

Financial Giant that Rivals Citigroup, MSNBC (Sept. 15, 2008, 12:45 AM),

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26708958.
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entire U.S. economy." 161 After entering into the merger agreement in
September of 2008,162 Merrill's losses began to skyrocket in October
and November of 2009 beyond the expectations of the parties. 163
Rather than utilizing the potential MAC claim as a means of
renegotiating the terms of the merger agreement with Merrill, Bank
of America used the combined force of its leverage under the MAC
clause and the importance of the transaction to the U.S. economy in
order to essentially "muscle the federal government and U.S.
taxpayers into ponying up more bailout funds." 64
Although the federal government's lawyers-likely taking
into account the impact of recent MAC case law - did not believe that
a MAC claim would be successful if exercised, the threat that the
publicity of such a claim "'would likely cause the demise of Merrill
Lynch'" and significantly damage the nation's then fragile economy,
provided Bank of America with significant leverage against the
government.1 65 As a result of that leverage, Bank of America was
ultimately able to convince Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke,
to invest another $20 billion in bailout funds and provide further
protection against losses on nearly $118 billion in toxic assets. 166
Of course, the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch transaction
arose under unique circumstances that are perhaps unlikely to be
reproduced in more typical merger transactions in which the state of
the entire U.S. economy is not at stake. However, the basic paradigm
of an acquiror using a MAC claim to generate leverage in merger
transactions still appears to be a strategy that has been latched on to
by acquirors in more typical transactions.

161 See Sue Reisinger, How Bank of America Used Merrill Losses to Bully the
Government: When Bank of America ConsideredNuclear Option, LAW.COM (Sept.
29, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=1202434147719&slreturn= 1&hbx
login=1, also availableat http://www.lexisnexis.com.
162 See Bank of America to Purchase Merrill Lynch: Deal Worth $50 Billion Creates
FinancialGiant that Rivals Citigroup,supra note 160.
163See Reisinger, supra note
161, at 1.
164Id. at
2.
165 Id. at
3.
166

Id.
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(ii) Sallie Mae and J.C. Flowers & Co.
A similar stand-off occurred in connection with the failed
acquisition of Sallie Mae by a consortium of investors led by J.C.
Flowers & Co. 167 The merger agreement executed by the parties in
April 2007 provided that a MAC included a material adverse effect
on the target, excluding those effects resulting from changes in
applicable law, but including (a) effects arising from those changes in
applicable law relating to the education-finance industry, and (b)
effects that are in the aggregate more adverse to the target than the
legislative proposals described in the target's most recent Form 10K.168
In September 2007, when federal legislation was passed
cutting subsidies to student lenders, the buyers attempted to
terminate the deal under the MAC provision, arguing that the impact
of the legislation was greater than what had been described in Sallie
Mae's Form 10-K. 169 As a result, Sallie Mae sued the buyers in the
Delaware Court of Chancery in an attempt to either force the closing
of the transaction or, in the alternative, pay the $900 million
termination fee provided for in the agreement. 170 Ultimately, the
buyers were able to use the uncertainty as to whether the events were
sufficient to constitute a MAC as leverage to convince Sallie Mae to
terminate the agreement and to drop their claim for the termination
fee in exchange for a $31 billion refinancing of Sallie Mae Debt. 171
(iii) Home Depot, Inc. and Pro Acquisition Corp.
Another example of how an acquiror can utilize a vague
MAC claim to force a target to renegotiate the terms of a transaction
arose in the failed acquisition of HD Supply, Inc. and CND Holdings,
Inc., subsidiaries of Home Depot, Inc., by Pro Acquisition
Corporation. 172 After the parties entered into a merger agreement in
June 2007, under which the acquirors agreed to purchase all of the
167

Block, supra note 30, at 401.

168Id.
169 Id. at

402.

170Id.
172
72

1

Id.
Id. at 401.

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

128

V. 19

capital stock of the target corporations for $10.325 billion, Pro
Acquisition asserted that the collapse of the housing market and the
ensuing general turmoil in the credit market constituted a MAC
under the agreement. 173 This claim was particularly questionable,
given that both changes conceivably fell within the agreement's
carve-outs to the definition of MAC. Nonetheless, the purchaser was
able to use this dubious claim as leverage compelling the target to
lower the purchase price under the merger agreement to $8.5
billion- representing a 17.6% discount of the original purchase
price. 174
C. Other Potential Consequences
In addition to the existing trends described above, the current
Delaware approach to MAC clauses has the potential to generate
systemic change in the market for mergers and acquisitions. First, the
decreased flexibility permitted to acquirors through MAC clauses as
a result of the "seller-friendly" approach may drive up-and may
already be driving up-the purchase price in some merger
transactions. Second, it is possible acquirors will begin to push to
have their merger agreements governed by the laws that are more
friendly to acquirors in MAC disputes. 175

VII.

REVIEW OF BRITISH APPROACHES TO MAC CLAUSES

In the United Kingdom, Public merger agreements are
regulated by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ("Takeover
Panel"). 176 The Takeover Panel is an independent body established in
1968 consisting of up to thirty-four members drawn from selected
business and financial organizations. 177 Its primary function is to
issue and administer the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers ("City
Code"), which provides a framework for takeovers in the U.K. and is
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designed to promote the integrity of the financial markets.178 While
MAC clauses appear less frequently in the U.K. than in the U.S., a
substantial body of law has nonetheless developed to govern their

operation in U.K. merger agreements.179
A.

The U.K. Takeover Panel and City Code

The City Code is based on six guiding principles that
takeovers must follow.180 Each such principle expressly overrides the
more specific language of the thirty-seven City Code Rules. 181 The

fourth such principle, which has been recognized as the most
pertinent in the context of interpreting MAC clauses,182 provides:
False markets must not be created in the securities of

the offeree company, of the offeror company or of any
other company concerned by the bid in such a way
that the rise or fall of the prices of the securities
becomes artificial and the normal functioning of the
markets is distorted.183
The fourth general principle expresses the concern of the Takeover
Panel that ambiguity surrounding acquirors' ability to terminate
merger transactions has a negative impact on the securities market as
a whole, and thus, there is a preference for clarity in contracts
effecting the market for securities. 184
In addition, the City Code sets forth certain regulations
relating specifically to MAC clauses.18 5 First, Rule 13.1 disallows
MAC clauses that depend solely on subjective judgments of either

178 See THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER
CODE

A3-A7 (RR
Donnelley, 10th ed. 2011) [hereinafter City Code], available at http:/www.
thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11 /code.pdf.
17
Elken, supra note 11, at 319-20.
180 Id. at

320.
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83 City Code, supra note
184 Elken, supra note 11,

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

130

V. 19

party's board of directors. 186 Rather, the Takeover Panel is granted
authority as to the ultimate determination of whether a MAC has
occurred in a particular transaction.187 In other words, an acquiror
under a U.K. merger agreement would not be able to unilaterally
terminate the deal based on its subjective assessment that a MAC has
occurred. In addition, Rule 13.4 relates more specifically to preclosing conditions such as MAC clauses, providing:
An offeror should not invoke any condition or precondition so as to cause the offer not to proceed, to
lapse or to be withdrawn unless the circumstances
which give rise to the right to invoke the condition or
pre-condition are of material significance to the
offeror in the context of the offer.188
Thus, Rule 13.4, in effect, limits the ability of acquirors to walk-away
from transactions by appending all qualifying conditions to closing
by the concept of "materiality," whether or not such provision is
actually qualified by the definition of MAC under the terms of the
contract.
Furthermore, the structure of MAC clauses in British public
merger agreements differs from their U.S. counterparts in that, as a
result of the regime established by the Takeover Panel, they lack the
highly negotiated MAC exceptions characteristic of MAC clauses in
the U.S.189 Thus, MAC clauses in the U.K. are relatively uniform and
resemble the traditional MAC clause in the U.S. prior to the
development of its modern incarnations.190 A typical MAC clause in a
British public merger agreement might read: "[save as publicly
disclosed] no adverse change or deterioration having occurred in the
business, assets, financial or trading position or profits or prospects
or operational performance of an member of the Group which in any
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case is material in the context of the wider Group taken as a
whole."191
B.

Tempus Group PLC v. WAPP Group PLC

The seminal case interpreting a MAC provision under British
law arose in 2001 when the advertising firm WPP Group PLC
("WWP") attempted to walk-away from its acquisition of its industry
competitor, Tempus Group PLC ("Tempus"). 192 One day prior to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, WPP posted an offer to
purchase all remaining outstanding Tempus stock.193 After the
attacks, WPP approached the Takeover Panel for a ruling as to
whether, under the term of the City Code, WPP could invoke its
termination rights under the agreement's MAC clauses due to the
turbulent economic conditions that followed.194 The Takeover Panel
rejected WPP's claim, holding that excuse under a MAC provision
"requires an adverse change of very considerable significance
striking at the heart of the purpose of the transaction in question,
analogous . . . to something that would justify frustration of a legal
contract." 195 In reaching this holding, the Takeover Panel cited a 1974
statement issued during a time of similarly turbulent economic
conditions, which provided that unless the above test is satisfied, "a
change in economic, industrial or political circumstances will not

Jeffrey Rothschild, Nick Azis, Patrice Corbiau, Dennis White & Abigail Reed,
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a condition to closing, providing: "since 31 December 2000 and save as disclosed in
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normally justify the withdrawal of an announced offer." 196 Based on
that statement, the Takeover Panel reasoned that while the economic
impact of September 11, 2001 were "exceptional" and "unforeseeable" and clearly contributed to the market declines already
impacting advertising, it nonetheless did not undermine the rationale
behind WPP's desire to enter into the merger agreement nor the price
of its offer. 197
In response to criticism generated by the decision, in 2001, the
Takeover Panel both codified and clarified the standard established
in Tempus, indicating that a MAC does not actually have to rise to the
level of legal frustration of contract, however, reaffirming that the
threshold for invoking a MAC clause remains "a high one" and that
the material change asserted still must be "very considerable
significance striking at the heart of the purpose of the transaction."198

C. Comparing the BritishApproach to U.S. Law
The most fundamental difference between the U.S. and
British Approach to MAC clauses lies in the very existence of the
Takeover Panel and City Code's general principles of fairness,
openness and equality among shareholders. 199 In the U.S., there is no
equivalent administrative body injecting such public policy into the
market for mergers. 200 Furthermore, in the U.K., the public policy
embodied in the City Code creates a strong presumption that the
acquiror assumes the risk associated with unexpected events. 201 In
contrast, U.S. courts have recognized no such public policy
presumption, and rather, have relied exclusively on contract law and
the intent of the parties as expressed in determining which party
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should bear such risk. 202 Finally, in the U.S., a MAC clause is not
subject to any industry or economic specific carve-outs, unless
specifically bargained for, whereas the City Code incorporates such
carve-outs whether or not bargained for, as discussed above. 203
VIII. Is THERE A WAY TO MITIGATE THE UNCERTAINTY GENERATED BY
U.S. MAC CLAUSES?
Given the limited practical utility of MAC clauses as a
mechanism for walking away from a transaction, as well as the
uncertainty generated by MAC provisions in the U.S. market for
mergers, there appears to be a cognizable necessity to rework the
fundamental approach taken in drafting such provisions. While no
one system is without criticism, both the U.S. case law and the British
approach to MAC clauses provide useful lessons for the drafting
attorneys and the contracting parties to a merger agreement.
A. Interpretive Solutions: The Risk/LUncertainty Dichotomy
In his paper, "On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual
Conditions," Eric Talley attempts to establish a useful paradigm for
understanding the rights associated with MAC clauses in the context
of recent Delaware case law.204 Talley posits that, distinct from
parties' assessment of risk is their assessment of the potential
uncertainty, or ambiguity, associated with a given transaction. 205 In
line with recent economic and financial literature, Talley argues that
while "'[rjisk' refers to randomness whose probabilistic nature is
extremely familiar and can be characterized with objective probabilities . . . [while] '[ulncertainty,' in contrast, refers to randomness
whose probabilistic behavior is extremely unfamiliar, unknown, or
even unknowable."20 6 Following this reasoning, Talley advances the
notion that the extent of a party's "uncertainty-aversion" is based on
how that party forms subjective beliefs or conjectures about
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unknown factors in its environment. 207 In the context of definitive
merger agreements, Talley asserts that MAC clauses are the primary
mechanism enabling parties to manage their own uncertaintyaversion and the overall ambiguity associated with a transaction. 208
By broadening the scope of a MAC clause, the weight of ambiguity is
shifted to the target and, by narrowing it, to the acquiror. 209
Talley's risk/uncertainty dichotomy has the potential to serve
as a guiding principle for parties struggling to understand when it is
appropriate to rely on a MAC clause. For example, Strine's rationale
that the materiality of an adverse change to a target's business
prospects must be viewed in the long-term, rather than the shortterm, 210 supports the notion that MAC clauses are more appropriately
relied on for the management of ambiguity rather than risk. Thus, if
acquirors intend for a more familiar risk to trigger their right to walk
away, that right should be specifically contracted for in a clause other
than the contract's MAC provision.
Furthermore, the practical complications associated with
negotiating specificity into a traditional MAC provision counsels
parties to manage short-term risk through other contract provisions,
the most obvious choice being representations and warranties. For
example, in IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., there were several
alternative contract mechanisms available to the parties which were
likely better suited for the management of short-term risk and thus,
could have potentially better protected Tyson from the risk that IBP's
first quarter earnings would fall.211 The parties might, for example,
have included a warranty by the target that its earnings in a
particular quarter will not fall below a specified amount. Of course,
specifying such an amount in a warranty might create further
expense and complications in negotiation. However there may be
some significant advantages to restricting the management of such
risk to representations and warranties. First, this approach may limit
the possibility that a court will interpret the parties' specificity as a
signal to limit the scope of the separate and distinct rights granted in
207
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a MAC clause. Second, by restricting the management of more
familiar risk to other contract provisions, in line with the court's
reasoning in IBP, the parties leave their MAC clause to appropriately
serve "as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of
unknown events", 212 or the management of uncertainty.
However, as Talley recognizes, it remains unclear whether
courts analyzing merger agreements actually treat risk differently
than uncertainty when analyzing whether an event falls under the
parameters of a MAC clause. 213 Thus, while the distinction may be
theoretically sound, in practice, parties should be cautious when
evaluating an event under the risk/uncertainty dichotomy.
B.

Proposed Drafting Solutions

As discussed above, it remains unclear what circumstances
would be sufficient for the Delaware Chancery to excuse an
acquiror's obligations under such a provision. Thus, rather than
speculating as to the types of scenarios which might be held to
constitute a MAC, it is more productive for parties entering merger
agreements, and attorneys drafting MAC clauses, to consider
alternative ways of drafting MAC clauses in order to maximize their
effectiveness in accomplishing the intent of the parties.
(i) Providing Specific Benchmarks for "Materiality"
As reflected by Delaware case law, it appears that MAC
clauses as currently drafted in the majority of U.S. merger
agreements will nearly always be held to be ambiguous. 214 Thus, the
court is required to look to other parts of the contract, as well as
outside the contract, in order to determine the underlying intentions
of the parties. Therefore, unless the overall approach to drafting such
provisions is modified by practitioners, the most important guiding
principle behind that modification must be specificity in drafting in
order for it to accomplish with certainty the goal of the parties in
negotiating a MAC provision.
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One potential option is for U.S. acquirors to include specific
quantitative or qualitative benchmarks, indicating that a decline in
earnings (or other economic indicator) of a delineated amount over a
specified period, or the occurrence of a specific class of events, should
be considered "material" in the context of a MAC provision.
However, practitioners have resisted such specificity, likely because
it has the potential to create some significant problems in both
negotiation and litigation. First, reaching an agreement on such
guidelines could lead to significant expense and could potentially
complicate negotiations to the demise of the transaction. Second,
providing a dollar amount could lead an interpreting court to
construe an intention of the parties to limit events triggering a MAC
clause to that amount at a minimum. This is problematic for
acquirors basing their negotiation on the amount of their expectations
at the time of the contract's execution and the projections of
investment bankers or other intermediaries, both of which are subject
to change by the time the acquiror attempts to invoke the protections
of the provision.
Finally, perhaps the greatest practical concern in providing
qualitative guidelines is that such specificity leads courts to exclude
events not contemplated by those guidelines from the scope of the
provision, as occurred in the French case discussed above. However,
it is likely that such risk could be limited by providing for an
"including, without limitation" proviso to such benchmarks. While
this is no guarantee against the possibility that a court will
nonetheless narrow the scope of the clause based on the examples
provided, it nonetheless seems the better course of action when
compared to the alternative option of facing courts that have never
found an event sufficient to constitute a MAC.
In their book, The Art of M&A: A Merger/Acquisition/
Buyout Guide, Stanley Foster Reed, Alexandra Reed Lajoux, and H.
Peter Nesvold query the possibility of including a "basket amount"
as a mechanism for quantifying materiality in merger agreements. 215
A "basket," as more commonly used in merger agreements, is a
highly negotiated dollar amount set as a minimum loss a party must
suffer in order to recover damages under an indemnification
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provision. 216 Reed, Lajoux, and Nesvold suggest that, because the
more standard basket amount has little or nothing to do with the
concept of materiality in merger agreements, parties may want to
consider including a negotiated and distinct basket amount to be
incorporated into the definition of MAC. 217 As a practical matter,
including a basket amount in connection with a MAC provision is
likely the more prudent course of action, as opposed to negotiating
individual threshold amounts for specific types of events.
(ii) Drafting MAC Clauses as a Mechanism for Restructuring
In its persistent rejection of attempts by acquirors to walk
away from merger transactions under MAC provisions, the Court of
Chancery has expressed a general preference for enforcing
contractual obligations. This preference is likely motivated, at least in
part, by the court's desire to maximize economic efficiency and
minimize overall transaction costs. When an acquiror walks away,
the target is often left in a worse position than it was in at the outset.
This is compounded by the likelihood that the target has turned away
other bidders as a result of its contractual obligations to the former
acquiror. Furthermore, mergers often demand the attention of key
personnel essential to the target's day-to-day operations, thus
slowing the pace of the target's normal operations. The acquiror's
shareholders may suffer losses as a result of the expense (in terms of
both time and money) of due diligence and negotiation with respect
to the failed transaction. As Talley points out, from an economic
perspective, where adverse events constitute "more moderate levels
of uncertainty, closing the deal likely remains efficient, albeit on
restructured terms that are responsive to new information about
ambiguity." 218 Thus, it makes economic sense for MAC clauses to be
drafted to trigger a pre-negotiated restructuring of an original deal,
rather than terminating it entirely (similarly to the concept of earnout provisions).
However, the proposition that parties might be able to
contract ahead of time for a restructuring of a transaction upon the
216 id
217
218
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occurrence of an unknown event is a highly theoretical proposition.
Perhaps the primary limitation of such an approach is that due to the
very nature of ambiguity, parties may not know, and may not even
be able to speculate at the time of contracting, what deal terms they
would be willing to agree to after the occurrence of some future
unknown event. Nonetheless, it may be possible in theory for
creative lawyers and businessmen to delineate a means of
categorizing either the adverse events themselves, or perhaps more
realistically, the extent of the adverse effect of such events. However,
this notion in turn raises another potential limitation. Even if such a
system of categorization were devised, there would inevitably
remain events and effects that may be too unlikely to justify the costs
associated with pre-negotiated contingencies, or alternatively, that
are simply impossible to contemplate in advance. Still, there may be
ways to work around such limitations. For example, the parties could
include a "catch-all" provision whereby unanticipated events or
changes trigger a more open-ended form or restructuring, such as a
requirement that the parties agree to negotiate in good faith for a
specified period of time.
Such limitations aside, there are several potential benefits to
this alternative approach. First, it would limit the economic waste
that results from the alternative scenario of terminating the deal.
Second, it may serve to minimize the chances of litigation. If the
consequences of triggering a MAC provision are less severe, targets
may be more resistant to incurring the costs of litigation than to
proceeding with a pre-negotiated restructuring. Furthermore, if a
dispute regarding whether the provision has been triggered results in
litigation, the court would presumably look more favorably on an
acquiror's request that the court affect a pre-negotiated restructuring
than it would on a request to excuse contractual obligations. Rather
than being faced with the more extreme options of either specific
performance or rescission, the court would also have the more
palatable option of affecting an agree-to restructuring of the original
agreement, thus maximizing the possibility of a favorable outcome
for the acquiror.
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(iii) Arbitration by Financial Experts
Finally, the concept of the U.K. Takeover Panel may in and of
itself provide useful lessons for U.S. merger and acquisition practitioners. Whereas judges may not be versed in certain particularities
effecting specific industries or securities markets as a whole, a panel
of financial experts may be in a better position to evaluate a MAC
dispute than would a panel of judges. Thus, if the parties agree at the
time of contracting that this is indeed likely to be the case based on
the nature of their transaction, they might consider negotiating a
dispute resolution clause calling for binding arbitration by a panel of
financial experts and agreeing to the identity of those experts at the
time of contracting.
C. Proposed Legislative and Administrative Solutions
As discussed above, while not without its own flaws, the
British approach of providing administrative guidelines for parties
drafting MAC provisions in merger agreements may provide useful
lessons for policymakers in the U.S. Parties to merger agreements in
the U.S. have been extremely reluctant to include specific
benchmarks when defining the term "MAC" in merger agreements.
This phenomenon is likely primarily the result of concerns that such
benchmarks will cause courts to construe such specificity as the
intent of the parties to exclude events that fall outside the parameters
of those benchmarks from the definition of MAC. In light of the
reluctance of parties to modify their approach to drafting MACs, and
given the negative public policy consequences that have resulted
from the current U.S. approach, U.S. policy makers should consider
the possibility of clarifying the concept of "materiality" through
statute or administrative code. Such a legislative approach wuld
likely be desirable from the perspective of both acquirors and targets
looking for certainty in contracting, while eliminating the potential
for courts to narrowly construe MAC clauses that include specific
benchmarks negotiated by the parties.
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IX. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued the existing approach to drafting
MAC clauses in the U.S. has proven unworkable in practice, and
thus, that a fundamental reevaluation of how MAC clauses are
drafted in merger agreement is warranted. Unless such a
reevaluation is undertaken, it is likely that U.S. courts will continue
to refuse to allow parties to invoke termination rights under MAC
clauses in virtually any circumstances, and parties will continue to
face the negative market conditions discussed in Part V above.

